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In 1991 at the time of the Gulf War, Canadian Navy Lieutenant Andrew 
S. Liebmann sought and was offered 
a posting as Executive Assistant 
to Commodore Ken Summers, the 
Commander of Canadian Forces 
Middle East. The Government of 
Canada had placed the naval, air, 
and ground forces despatched to the 
Gulf on active service, and for the first 
time since the Korean War, Canada’s 
armed forces were going to war.
 Lieutenant  (N)  Liebmann, 
however, was not to go with them. 
Although the Gulf campaign was a 
war, not peacekeeping, the regular 
practice of the Canadian Forces of 
ascertaining the religion and ethnic 
origin of members being despatched 
on peacekeeping appears to have 
been followed in Liebmann’s case, 
though perhaps mistakenly (as the 
Department of National Defence 
(DND) alleges). This practice of 
screening had been in effect for 
peacekeeping forces in the Middle 
East since 1956 and in Cyprus since 
1964 and possibly since Canada 
first joined the United Nations 
Truce Supervisory Organization 
[UNTSO] on the Arab-Israeli borders 
in February 1954. Being identified 
as a Jew, Lieutenant Liebmann’s 
posting, for which he had been 
instructed to ready himself, was 
cancelled for reasons that remain 
in dispute. The question at issue, 
however, is no longer what happened 
to Liebmann and why. Instead, 
the key question now is whether 
the policy of screening Canadian 
Forces personnel for peacekeeping 
operations on the basis of religion 
and ethnicity is a reasonable limit 
in accordance with section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms that can be demonstrably 
justified in a democratic society.
 I am a historian, not a lawyer, 
and the historian’s first recourse is 
to the published literature. While 
there are some studies of First and 
Second World War policies, other 
than National Defence Headquarters 
(NDHQ) Instruction Deputy Chief of 
the Defence Staff (DCDS) documents 
and Canadian Forces Administrative 
Orders (CFAOs), regrettably there is 
quite literally nothing in print that 
touches on the Canadian Forces’ policy 
of screening personnel despatched on 
peacekeeping operations – let alone 
into combat – to ensure that no one’s 
religion, ethnicity, or gender might 
cause upset in the host country or 
possibly hinder the effectiveness of 
the Canadian contingent. Nor do I 
have access to recent DND documents 
other than those disclosed for this 
case by the Department of Justice. 
For the purpose of this evidence, 
however, I have read the DCDS and 
CFAO documents and conducted 
interviews with some individuals 
who have relevant knowledge, and 
I have done research on past aspects 
of Canada’s military policy and 
operations that bear on this case.
The Great War
The Canadian Forces in the 20th century have long practiced a 
discriminatory policy in enlistments. 
During the Great War, there were 
numerous examples of such policy, 
though it was never formalized, 
being motivated more by the 
prejudices of those in command 
or in the Cabinet at any one time. 
The government worried about the 
difficulties involved in recruiting 
recent immigrants into the army, 
fearing problems with language 
and, more seriously, worried over 
the enemy alien status of some. In 
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1916, for example, a proposal to 
raise a Polish battalion in Canada 
was rejected, in part because of a 
rumour that a Danish-Canadian in 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
had deserted to the Germans and 
revealed information. Proposals 
to raise a battalion of Japanese 
Canadians received similarly short 
shrift though, perhaps because Japan 
was an ally and warships of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy operated 
patrols on the West Coast until 1917, 
individuals were allowed to enlist 
and 196 fought overseas. Chinese 
Canadians also enlisted in small 
numbers. The British Columbia 
provincial government was markedly 
unenthusiastic about the enlistment 
of Japanese and Chinese Canadians, 
primarily because it feared that 
military service would entitle those 
who served to the right to vote. 
Indeed, in the 1917 federal election, 
soldiers overseas, whatever their 
ethnicity, did cast ballots. This cut 
no ice in provincial politics, however, 
and Japanese and Chinese Canadian 
veterans did not get the British 
Columbia franchise.
 The Minister of Militia and 
Defence also expressed concern that 
native Canadians might not receive 
“the privileges of civilized warfare” 
in the front lines or if taken prisoner; 
his Chief of the General Staff feared, 
on the other hand, that Indians 
could not withstand the rigours 
of trench warfare and might fight 
among themselves. And when the 
government, increasingly desperate 
for men, tried to encourage black 
enlistments, General Gwatkin, the 
Chief of the General Staff objected in 
April 1916: “The civilized negroe [sic] 
is vain and imitative...the average 
white man will not associate with him 
on terms of equality.” The latter part 
of that comment was likely true. In 
the end a construction unit of African-
Canadians was raised and sent to 
France, while many individuals 
served in infantry battalions. 
 The Canadian government also 
connived at the recruitment of United 
States citizens before American entry 
to the war in April 1917, though 
some in Ottawa worried about 
such activities, and not only for fear 
of diplomatic repercussions. The 
Governor-General, the elderly Duke 
of Connaught, for example, was 
concerned in 1916 that “experience 
has so far shown that American 
citizens do not always make the best 
of soldiers.” Whatever could have 
created that fear, other than sheer anti-
Americanism, was unimaginable.
 During the Great War, some 
thousands of nursing sisters aside, 
women were not recruited for service 
in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force. This has provoked the ire 
of a few present day Canadian 
feminist historians. In the widely 
used university text, History of the 
Canadian Peoples by Margaret Conrad 
et al., such “exclusionary” policies 
were denounced for increasing the 
reinforcement shortages at the front. 
“Despite the eagerness of some 
women to go overseas,” the authors 
state without offering any evidence, 
“they were unwelcome on the front 
lines.” That women were unwelcome 
as combatants is clearly so; what the 
textbook authors fail to consider are 
the societal mores of the Great War 
era and the simple fact that none 
of the combatants on either side 
used women soldiers. The ongoing 
difficulties the Canadian Forces have 
in integrating women into combat 
units today suggest that the gender 
problem, while insoluble in the 1914-
1918 war, continues.
The Second World War
Th e  C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t f o l l o w e d  r o u g h l y  s i m i l a r 
recruiting policies in the Second 
World War. Once again, women 
were not combatants, though in this 
war, the army, navy and air force 
recruited women – in all, 50,000 
served – for a variety of behind-the-
lines roles designed to release men 
for front-line service. There was no 
overt discrimination against African-
Canadians – the idea of a black 
construction battalion was no longer 
acceptable to the Canadian public, 
and blacks volunteered or were 
conscripted as were other Canadians. 
Once again, native Canadians were 
encouraged to volunteer and large 
numbers did so. However, there was 
substantial resistance by Canadian 
Indians to the conscription for 
home defence provisions of the 
National Resources Mobilization 
Act 1940. Band leaders argued that 
Indians constituted nations within 
the Canadian nation and thus were 
not subject to compulsory military 
service. The resulting story is 
complex, but, Michael Stevenson, the 
one student of the subject, has noted 
that compulsion was enforced with 
“policies of apathy and indifference” 
in the face of a Native “resistance 
campaign.” The results of the call-
up of aboriginal Canadians were 
insignificant at best.
 Overt discrimination was the 
policy faced by Chinese and Japanese 
Canadians.  Although Canada 
actively encouraged enlistment from 
virtually every other group, barriers 
were placed in the way of Asians. 
In British Columbia, there had 
been longstanding and substantial 
p r e j u d i c e s  a g a i n s t  J a p a n e s e 
Canadians especially and secondarily 
against Chinese Canadians. In 1940, 
B.C.’s Attorney-General urged the 
federal government not to call up 
Japanese Canadians for military 
service: “if these men are called upon 
to perform the duties of citizens 
and bear arms for Canada, it will be 
impossible to resist the argument that 
they are entitled to the franchise.” 
Those who had served overseas 
during the Great War had won the 
right to vote, and this concerned the 
British Columbia government. The 
federal government concurred and, 
for good measure, it also exempted 
Japanese and Chinese Canadians 
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from military training under the 
National Resources Mobilization 
Act. Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
explained the decision on the grounds 
that “the danger of the whole Oriental 
problem” made it essential to act 
on the wishes and judgment of the 
provincial government. After protests 
from within the federal government, 
however, Ottawa created a Special 
Committee on Orientals to report, 
a m o n g  o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  o n  t h e 
question of military training. The 
Committee report (2 December 1940) 
recommended “most reluctantly and 
not unanimously” that “Canadians 
of Japanese race should not be given 
military training.” Chinese Canadians 
too, the Committee recommended, 
should not be called upon for 
military service. On 9 January 1941, 
the Prime Minister accepted the 
Committee recommendations: 
henceforth, Japanese and Chinese 
Canadians would not be accepted for 
military service. This decision was 
enthusiastically received by white 
British Columbians. In fact, a few 
Asians were enlisted. Some joined up 
before the ban was put in place, and 
a Nisei was accepted into the Army’s 
Forestry Corps in July 1941, two more 
joined the army later in the year, and 
so did a Chinese Canadian. 
 Curiously, after 7 December 1941 
and the Canadian declaration of war 
against Japan, an interdepartmental 
committee in Ottawa recommended 
the enlistment of Asian Canadians – 
to  avo id  the  sense  o f  rac ia l 
discrimination among Japanese 
and Chinese Canadians and, more 
important, to prevent envy among 
white Canadians at their compatriots’ 
relief from military obligations. 
This recommendation was turned 
down by a Cabinet committee. The 
army appeared to concur, the Chief 
of the General Staff noting that 
“While Canadian born persons of 
Japanese origin may appear to be 
good Canadian citizens, they do, 
however, bear the appearance and 
characteristics of another race, which 
immediately sets them apart from 
the average Canadian.” When it was 
urged that those Japanese Canadians 
already enlisted be released from the 
service, the Cabinet War Committee 
agreed but suggested that the Army 
discharge them on “other than racial 
grounds.” There is no evidence 
of such dismissals, but further 
enlistment was forbidden. A few 
Chinese Canadians did manage to 
enlist before, in 1944, Ottawa declared 
Chinese Canadians subject to call-
up under the National Resources 
Mobilization Act. By January 1945, 
after requests had been received 
from Britain and Australia for 
Japanese interpreters, translators and 
specialists, the Canadian government 
allowed the enlistment of a small 
number of Japanese Canadians. It 
apparently mattered not at all that the 
United States Army had successfully 
raised a regiment of Japanese 
Americans for combat service in 
the European theatre of operations, 
service that was performed with 
high distinction. In all, 134 Japanese 
Canadians served during the war, 
a tribute to their loyalty to Canada 
despite the discrimination to which 
they had been subjected. There are 
no accurate figures for Chinese 
Canadian enlistment.
 There is another point that 
deserves to be made. In the Second 
World War, the Canadian Forces 
enlisted 16,720 Jews. Substantial 
anti-Semitism existed in Canada, and 
early in the war, at least, this was 
particularly so in the Royal Canadian 
Navy. Edwin Goodman records in his 
memoirs that when he tried to enlist 
in the Navy, he was told, “Forget this 
program…I doubt that anyone who 
is Jewish will be an officer in this 
man’s navy.” As Goodman noted, 
“The navy was the one branch of 
the service that had a reputation for 
bigotry, but that later disappeared 
with the growing need for recruits.” 
Others have written similarly.
 Almost all of those Jews who 
served overseas fought in Europe 
against Germany. I raise this because 
of Nazi policies toward Jews. While it 
is doubtful that Canadian authorities 
knew many details of the Holocaust 
until very late in the war, no one 
doubted Nazi hatred of Jews, but this 
neither prevented nor inhibited the 
Canadian government from putting 
Canadian Jews into action against 
Germany. All that was done to protect 
Jewish servicemen against Nazi 
vengeance was to stamp identity discs 
with “OD” (Other Denomination) 
rather than Hebrew or Jewish. Jewish 
veterans, including former Minister 
of National Defence Barney Danson, 
a Queen’s Own Rifles officer in 
Normandy, have told me that they 
discussed their fate if captured by 
the Wehrmacht or the SS – few seem 
to have expected much mercy. As it 
turned out, however, the Germans 
abided by the Geneva Convention 
and did not treat Jewish Prisoners of 
War (there were 84 Canadian Jewish 
POWs) more harshly than others; 
when Canada sent them into action, 
however, none in authority knew that 
this would be the case.
 Still, the government and armed 
forces had no other option. It was 
neither politically nor morally 
possible to exclude Canadian Jews 
from combat on the grounds that the 
Nazis might treat them differently 
than other POWs. All the Jews in 
the armed forces were volunteers 
(except for those conscripted under 
the National Resources Mobilization 
Act), and they asked nothing from 
their government that other Canadian 
servicemen did not. During the war, 
in other words, Canadian Jews 
served, fought, and risked death 
exactly as all Canadian soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen did. This was as 
it should have been.
Peacekeeping
The first Canadian peacekeepers went abroad in 1950 to serve with 
the United Nations Military Observer 
Group India-Pakistan. This sending 
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of a handful of officers was followed, 
as noted above, by the despatch 
of an additional small number of 
observers to UNTSO along the 
borders between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours in 1954. In the same year, 
Canada sent a substantial number of 
officers and enlisted men to Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia to serve on the 
International Control Commissions, 
the nation’s first non-United Nations 
peacekeeping effort. Canada’s first 
major deployment in the service of 
United Nations peacekeeping came 
on the heels of the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
Secretary of State for External Affairs 
Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace 
Prize for his invention of what might 
be called interpository peacekeeping 
as a way of separating the attacking 
British-French-Israeli forces from 
the Egyptians. The United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) was the 
result, and Canada despatched a 
contingent of more than a thousand 
men.
 There is an allusion in the 
transcript of evidence, taken for 
this case in 1996, of Colonel J.M. 
Snell that the religion of servicemen 
being considered for UNEF service 
might have been a factor in postings 
as early as 1957. I believe this to be 
very likely and can contribute one 
additional piece of data to this story. 
In 1960-1961, I was in my fourth 
year at the Royal Military College 
of Canada, my intention at that time 
being to serve on graduation as a 
regular Army officer. As part of my 
course in honours history, I was 
writing an undergraduate thesis 
on Canadian peacekeeping, and I 
secured access to some otherwise 
closed records at NDHQ, Ottawa, 
including nominal rolls of those 
personnel sent to UNEF between 1957 
and 1960. I had no way of ascertaining 
the religion of Canadian personnel so 
I simply checked the rolls, looking for 
obvious Jewish names (a method also 
mentioned in the Snell’s evidence). 
I recognized that this was a highly 
imperfect device, but I was interested 
to see if there was a practical religious 
test being applied, not least because 
I wondered how my being Jewish in 
origin could affect my own military 
career. I found no such names and 
reported this in my thesis.1 How 
significant this was, frankly, was 
unclear primarily because I had no 
idea how many Jews were then in the 
Canadian Forces. My own military 
career ended in 1966 and, as I never 
had the opportunity to serve on a 
Middle East peacekeeping mission, 
my nominal religion in no way 
affected my service.
 As for  post-UNEF Middle 
East peacekeeping, whatever the 
administrative orders, anything 
other than anecdotal evidence is very 
limited. I asked Barney Danson and 
Lieutenant-General (retired) Charles 
Belzile, a former commander of the 
Army, if they were aware of Jewish 
or other servicemen being barred 
from peacekeeping in the Middle 
East Danson recalled one case that 
occurred during his time as Minister 
(1976-1979) when a Jewish soldier 
was dropped from a peacekeeping 
mission. There was a fuss and Danson, 
who believed this was improper, had 
the case re-examined. In the end, he 
said, the soldier was given the choice 
of proceeding and, after weighing all 
circumstances, decided to go. This 
seems a good solution.
 Even before a written policy 
was formulated at NDHQ, Belzile 
recalled that when there were cases of 
potential difficulty on peacekeeping 
operations arising out of religion 
or ethnicity, the usual practice 
in his time as Army commander 
was to unofficially discourage the 
serviceman. He recalled the case of 
a Turkish-Canadian officer whose 
suitability for a posting to Cyprus was 
questioned. What would the Greek 
Cypriots say? What if the officer had 
relatives in Turkey, a NATO ally 
but scarcely a democracy, and was 
subjected to pressure as a result? 
Belzile indicated that there were 
discussions, including some with 
the officer in question, presumably 
in an effort to dissuade the officer 
from accepting the posting. In the 
end, the officer was sent to Cyprus 
but his employment in the field 
was restricted. For example, he was 
not permitted to lead patrols into 
Greek Cypriot territory. This seems 
a perfectly sensible compromise, one 
that minimized any possible harm 
to the effectiveness of the Canadian 
force and one that would not hurt 
the career of the officer in question 
as might have occurred if he had 
been forbidden an overseas posting. 
Given Canada’s 30 years in Cyprus 
and the centrality of peacekeeping to 
the Canadian Forces for much of the 
period from 1964 to 1994 that Canada 
had troops there, it is reasonable 
to believe that an officer barred 
from service in Cyprus might have 
suffered in his career.2
 A Deputy Chief of the Defence 
Staff Instruction (DCDS 9/83) 
formalized the Canadian Forces 
policy in 1983. While piously stating 
that there would be no posting 
restrictions “for purely ethnic, racial 
or religious reasons,” the policy went 
on to suggest that “considerations of 
safety and neutrality…might exist or 
arise that could impede the effective 
functioning” of a peacekeeping force 
or the safety of an individual or other 
members of the force. To obviate 
this, the policy directed that “the 
personnel records of all CF members 
nominated for peacekeeping duties 
will be screened” prior to posting. 
“If it appears that ethnic, racial 
or religious considerations could 
cause significant difficulties in the 
peacekeeping theatre concerned, 
individuals may be precluded from 
selection for such duties.” The 
policy also allowed for the recall of 
personnel if their race, religion or 
ethnicity is found to cause problems 
in theatre. The Canadian Forces 
policy after this instruction came into 
force was, therefore, discriminatory 
despite the use of the weasel words 
“may be precluded.” Nonetheless, 
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Robert Fowler, in March 1989 the 
Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) 
at NDHQ, declared it “appropriate” 
that this policy “be tightened up 
somewhat,” adding that the reason 
for this was “to protect the rights 
and safety of members, and not to 
ignore their rights.” What Fowler 
could have meant by this tightening 
up of a discriminatory practice as a 
method of protecting the rights of 
Canadian Forces personnel is unclear 
to me. Nonetheless the process 
urged by Fowler obviously resulted 
in the issuance of Canadian Forces 
Administrative Order 20-53, a further 
codification of the Canadian Forces’ 
discriminatory practices.
 It seems clear that this policy 
has been applied almost exclusively 
in the Middle East. Belzile told me 
in an interview that he had visited a 
battalion of the Royal 22e Régiment 
in Haiti in 1997 in his capacity as 
Colonel Commandant. The Canadian 
force there included an intelligence 
section of Haitian-Canadians, all 
either born in Haiti or in Canada of 
Haitian parents. These men spoke 
the Haitian patois and understood 
the local society, a clear advantage 
to the Canadian force. On the other 
hand, given the political, economic, 
and class divisions in Haitian society, 
they might have been exposed to 
pressures from various factions. 
NDHQ apparently did not consider 
the possibility of pressure being 
exerted on service personnel of 
Haitian origin or ethnicity in such 
a case to be serious enough to block 
their inclusion in the Canadian 
contingent. That a different policy 
was and is applied in the Middle 
East to Jewish and Muslim service 
personnel is repugnant.
  It is also worth noting that for 
the last decade and a half, female 
Canadian Forces personnel have been 
posted overseas in an ever-increasing 
variety of roles, including service 
in infantry units on peace support 
operations. There were also women 
sailors on board Canadian Navy 
vessels during the Gulf War, a policy 
that might have been construed to 
be potentially as offensive to strict 
Muslim Arab allies as the presence 
of a Canadian Jewish officer. 
American, British 
and UN Practices
Indeed, the United States forces, the major provider of troops for the Gulf 
War, based large numbers of women 
in Saudi Arabia. It is abundantly clear 
that the Saudi authorities raised no 
more objection to US women than 
they did to American Jewish service 
personnel serving on their soil and 
in their waters. Presumably, and 
properly, American women service 
personnel, just like Jewish personnel, 
were briefed on how to – and how 
not to – behave to minimize Saudi 
concerns. Significantly, the United 
States military followed its policies 
which are non-discriminatory.
 Indeed, the American practice 
o f  p o s t i n g  s e r v i c e  m e m b e r s 
overseas, detailed in Department of 
Defense Directive 1315.7 – Military 
Personnel Assignments, is very 
clear: “Assignment shall be made 
for all service members without 
regard to their color, race, religious 
preference (except chaplains), ethnic 
background, national origin, age, or 
gender (except where prohibited by 
statute and limitation of facilities) 
consistent with requirements for 
physical capabilities.” Moreover, the 
Directive lays down a procedure to 
be followed if a foreign government 
refuses to accept US personnel. A 
“Summary of Selected Nations’ 
Policy on Employment Restrictions 
Peacekeeping Forces,” prepared in 
NDHQ in March 1989 did, however, 
note that “unofficially, in practice” 
the US forces selectively fill positions 
in UNTSO “to ensure that the 
individual by reason of race, age, 
religion, etc, would not jeopardize the 
mission or cause undue hardship or 
danger to the individual or others.” 
How much weight should be put on 
information – gossip? – gathered to 
give NDHQ the information it so 
clearly sought is doubtful.
 For their part, the British have 
no written policy that would restrict 
serving officers and other ranks by 
virtue of ethnicity, gender, or religion. 
Women can be barred from certain 
posts to maintain a unit’s combat 
effectiveness, however, and the War 
Office exercises some caution – on a 
case by case basis – in considering 
whether to post women abroad 
“where their presence may cause 
offence to the host government…” 
While “All personnel in the British 
Armed Forces are treated as equal,” 
there might be cases that would 
require individual consideration, 
as in covert operations “where a 
person’s ethnic origin may prevent 
them from being selected.” The 
British therefore follow a practice that 
seems a pragmatic mix of principle 
and efficiency. There is no blanket 
prohibition, but on a case by case 
basis, judgments can be made on 
postings.
 It is worth noting that American 
a n d  B r i t i s h  p o l i c i e s  a r e  n o t 
hypothetical. Both the United States 
and Britain have contributed and 
continue to contribute to peacekeeping 
operations. At 31 December 1997, the 
British had 401 soldiers in Cyprus, 11 
on the Iraq-Kuwait border, 60 on the 
International Police Task Force, and 
7 on the UN Mission in Georgia for 
a total of 479. The United States had 
644 troops engaged in peacekeeping, 
with officers and other ranks serving 
on the Israel-Arab borders, on the 
Iraq-Kuwait border, in the Western 
Sahara, in Eastern Slavonia, on the 
International Police Task Force, in 
Macedonia, Georgia, and Haiti. At 
this same time, Canada deployed 254 
peacekeepers on eight missions.
 That the US and UK seem able 
to meet their extensive peacekeeping 
requirements without overt ly 
discriminatory regulations is worth 
noting. That Britain is the historic link 
to the Canadian military tradition and 
Granatstein - Liebmann.indd   5 1/28/2011   1:19:49 PM
5
: The Problem of Religion in Canadian Forces Postings Liebmann vs the Minister of National Defence et al.
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
73
the United States today is our closest 
military partner is also noteworthy. I 
can discern no reason why Canadian 
military regulations need be more 
discriminatory than those of our 
closest friends and allies.
  Why they  need be  more 
discriminatory than the policies 
of the United Nations itself again 
is unknown. When the Canadian 
Permanent Mission to the UN 
inquired in February 1989 of the 
“responsible UN official” what United 
Nations policy on the employment of 
personnel on peacekeeping was, the 
official simply passed the buck back 
to the contributing national military 
forces. The UN Force commander 
could determine the “assets and 
liabilities of each individual,” a 
phrase that could (and most likely 
does) refer to military efficiency 
rather than religion or gender. The 
UN official did indicate that women 
might be a potential problem in 
some countries and said that their 
employment has been limited “in 
order to avoid complications in 
the field.” The UN, however, also 
informed the Canadian delegation 
in New York that “With regard to 
religion, ‘religion is invisible’ but that 
females are not.”
 As documents provided by 
the Department of Justice indicate 
clearly, DND found this answer 
unsatisfactory.  Robert  Fowler 
observed in March 1989 that “it will 
not be possible to base our policy on 
the United Nations’ approach.” The 
Department then began a canvass of 
the policies followed by other nations 
in screening personnel for Middle 
East peacekeeping. All (Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Poland) 
had no policy on religion because 
of the tiny numbers of Jews or 
Muslims in their populations or 
armed forces. Australia classified 
peacekeeping as active service and 
automatically barred women. New 
Zealand apparently had not drawn 
its peacekeepers from military 
specialties in which women personnel 
in its armed forces were employed.
 Thus Canada was on its own in 
drafting its tightened policy, blazing 
a trail where none but Canada had 
gone before. The policy codified in 
Canadian Forces Administrative 
Order 20-53 represented DND’s 
attempt to do so, and the only 
concession to the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms was that, as the 
drafting progressed, the initial 
phrasing – the “cultural, religious 
and racial sensitivities” of the host 
nation – was altered to the slightly 
less blatant “cultural, religious, and 
other sensitivities.” Perhaps DND 
ought to have been just as concerned 
by the pandering to the cultural and 
religious sensitivities of host nations.
Conclusion
How does all this evidence apply to this case? In the first place, 
as has been noted above, Canadian 
policy has been discriminatory 
in this century. Blacks, Native 
Canadians, Japanese Canadians, and 
Chinese Canadians suffered overt 
discrimination in being prevented 
or discouraged from service during 
one or both of the First and Second 
World Wars. There is evidence that 
ethnicity has been a concern to the 
Canadian Forces, not least in Cyprus, 
as well as evidence that Jewish 
(and presumably Muslim) service 
personnel were prevented from 
serving with peacekeeping missions 
in the Middle East both before and 
after the enactment of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
Canadian nation and the Canadian 
Forces that serve it are increasingly 
multicultural in their makeup, and 
overt discrimination against those 
who seek to serve their country, 
wherever they come from, whatever 
their religion and ethnicity, must not 
be practiced or tolerated. There is, to 
be sure, a balance to be found between 
the rights of individual Canadian 
Forces personnel and the operational 
effectiveness of the peace support 
force in which they may serve, but 
it seems to me that individual rights 
and freedoms must almost always 
take precedence. Intelligently drafted 
regulations, sensibly and sensitively 
interpreted to protect the rights of 
individuals and assist the Canadian 
Forces to accomplish their mission, 
are needed, but blanket prohibitions 
are not the way to proceed.
 Consider one hypothetical 
situation. Say Canada was called on 
to send a battalion of infantry to do 
peacekeeping in Northern Ireland. 
In a bitterly sectarian conflict where 
Protestants and Roman Catholics 
historically have been at each others’ 
throats, which infantry unit could 
Canada send? The francophone 
Royal 22e Régiment, its members 
overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, 
might possibly be unacceptable to 
Ulster Unionists; the anglophone 
Royal Canadian Regiment,  i ts 
personnel substantially Protestant 
with some presumably also of 
Irish heritage, might be equally 
unacceptable to Sinn Féin. Other than 
raising a Jewish or Muslim regiment, 
how could Canada participate in 
such a peacekeeping operation? I 
suggest that it goes without saying 
that Canada would send the R22eR 
or the RCR without a moment’s 
hesitation, the very idea that there 
would be any problem of impartiality 
being dismissed at once by NDHQ. 
So it should be. But how then can the 
Canadian Forces suggest or imply 
that a Canadian Jew or Muslim might 
be an impediment to an operational 
mission in the Middle East? 
 The right to bear arms is a 
cherished tenet of citizenship, and 
it violates my sense of what Canada 
has become and is today to bar 
service personnel from honourable 
service solely because of their faith or 
ethnicity. After reading the relevant 
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff 
Instructions and Canadian Forces 
Administrative Orders, the trial 
record, the reasons for order, the 
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transcript of evidence of Colonel 
Snell, and the documents provided 
by the Department of Justice, I am 
forced to conclude that the Canadian 
Forces practices discrimination on 
the basis of religion and ethnicity. 
Canadian military personnel are 
Canadians, whatever their origins or 
faith, and they deserve to be treated 
as loyal servants of their nation. The 
present policy categorizes soldiers by 
race and religion and is profoundly 
repugnant.
Notes
1. In his Pearson’s Peacekeepers, Canada and 
the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-
67 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2009), p.132, Michael 
Carroll notes that in UNEF’s “early days” 
a Jewish Canadian soldier was recalled 
from UNEF duty for fear of being “a 
source of embarrassment to the United 
Nations.”
2. A dozen years after writing this deposition, 
I learned of another case involving a 
young Canadian-born officer of Greek 
origin who was posted to Cyprus with 
his battalion and then was summoned to 
see the Canadian contingent commander. 
The colonel “insisted that I not serve 
on the line lest I become a pretext for a 
problem.” The junior officer protested 
that he had already met his Greek and 
Turk counterparts who did not think his 
origins were an issue, but the colonel 
insisted “and so I had to be pulled off the 
line to work a logistic role or be pulled 
out of the country…I was extraordinarily 
angry at the time…” The young officer, 
now Colonel George Petrolekas, noted 
that he spoke fluent Greek and “the value 
that we lose by projecting a potential issue 
that doesn’t exist is that people like me 
could have been of greater help if used 
properly.” His security screening, he 
said, should have revealed that his family 
had no relatives in Cyprus and no enosis 
sympathies. Col. Petrolekas also noted 
that he later served in Former Yugoslavia 
where he was a co-religionist of the Serbs 
and that this had some benefits to the 
mission: “there is a wide gap between 
using…a religious/ethnic foundation 
on Canada’s behalf to being somehow 
thought of as co-opted.”Email from Col. 
Petrolekas, 8 February 2010. It is possible 
that General Belzile may have recalled the 
Petrolekas case and confused the officer’s 
ethnic origin. The time frame is roughly 
coincidental in both accounts.
J.L. Granatstein is co-author (with Dean 
F. Oliver) of The Oxford Companion to 
Canadian Military History (2010).
Anti-submarine trawlers built at St. Lawrence yards under Admiralty contract, and assigned to the Royal Canadian Navy for 
operations on the East Coast in view of the German U-boat operations in North American waters that began in the spring of 1918. 
The photograph is probably from the late spring of 1918 when the newly completed trawlers fitted out at Quebec City or Montreal.
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